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Though the importance of science and technology for 
rural India was appreciated in the 1930s by Gandhi, 
giving rise to the work of the Centre for Science for 
Villages, advanced institutions of education, science 
and technology turned their attention to this area only 
in the 1970s. The most well-known of these efforts was 
from the Indian Institute of Science with its pro-
gramme for the application of science and technology 
to rural areas known by its acronym ASTRA. ASTRA 
(recently renamed as Centre for Sustainable Tech-
nologies) was based on a model of science–technology 
interactions in a ‘dual society’ like India with a small 
affluent elite amidst a large economically deprived 
majority living primarily in rural areas. The model 
showed that inter alia an extension centre and a mis-
sion-oriented programme would be required to deve-
lop technologies to address the normally ignored 
needs of the rural population. While many features of 
this initial ASTRA model have been validated, it also 
had several shortcomings that are described. An 
attempt has been made in this article to indicate some 
directions along which the model should be updated 
taking into account the emphasis today on sustainable 
development. Special attention has been devoted to 
the failure modes in the generation, commercialization 
and dissemination of rural technologies. Finally, the 
barriers to the commercialization and dissemination 
of rural technologies are discussed. 
THE necessity of harnessing science and technology for 
transforming rural India has long been recognized. In 
fact, Gandhi had clearly shown an appreciation of this 
necessity. As early as 1935, at the All India Village Indus-
tries Association, Gandhi initiated a movement called 
‘Science for People’, with an advisory board of national 
personalities including scientists like J. C. Bose, P. C. Ray 
and C. V. Raman1. Unfortunately, very little s known 
about the deliberations of this advisory board. It is temp-
ting, however, to conjecture that the advisory board did 
not come out either with path-breaking clarity on insti-
tutional mechanisms or profound advice on areas/ topics 
of work. It was left therefore to the workers at the Centr
for Science for Villages, notably Devendra Kumar, to 
define directions for their efforts. They grappled with this 
challenge in a heroic manner. However, their efforts were 
rapidly marginalized by the overwhelming thrust of the 
mainstream scientific and technological establishment in 
the post-independence period. This establishment was 
pre-eminently dominated by the large number of scien-
tists and engineers who returned, after World War II from 
higher education in Europe and North America, strongly 
influenced by their studies and sojourns abroad. An even 
stronger determining force was the demand of Indian 
industry and the Indian government. The outcome of 
these forces will now be considered in a brief treatment 
of the post-independence science and technology scene. 
Post-independence science and technology 
Growth 
There are a number of aspects of the growth of post-inde-
pendence S&T that merit mention: (a) There has been a 
phenomenal growth in the total expenditure on R&D 
(Figure 1). (b) This growth has been through a marked 
increase in the number of S&T agencies/organizations (Fig-
ure 2). (c) Several of these agencies have shown a specta-
cular increase in the number of constituent S&T institutions 
(Figure 3). (d) The establishment and development of 
these institutions necessitated an enormous increase in 
the number of technical personnel. 
Bias towards urban, industrial and defence needs 
By and large, post-independence Indian science became 
western-oriented and Indian technology focused on the 
needs of urban settlements, industry, the central govern-
ment and to much smaller extent, the state governments. 
Thus, the main thrust of post-independence S&T effort 
was not in favour of the needs of rural areas. This con-
clusion is supported by (i) the bias in R&D expenditur , 
(ii) the bias in the distribution of institutions, (iii) the bias 
in the distribution of technical personnel, and (iv) the 
bias in the focus of Plans. 
ASTRA – an institutional experiment 
It was against this backdrop that there arose in the 1970s 
a number of new attempts to reorient Indian S&T towards 
the needs of rural India. Notable among these were the 
stirrings in the institutions of advanced education, sci-
ence and technology. e-mail: Amulya1@vsnl.com 
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 Perhaps the most well known of these efforts was effort 
by the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore. In 
1974, a presentation2 on ‘The choice of alternative tech-
nologies’ at the Bangalore meeting to discuss the Science 
and Technology Plan of the National Committee of Sci-
ence and Technology evoked a great deal of interest 
amongst the faculty of IISc. Several of these faculty mem-
bers were in favour of an attempt to translate the ideas of 
alternative technology into a practical programme. An 
opportunity to make a presentation to the IISc’s Senate 
Committee on Research and Academic Policy (SCRAP) 
was therefore requested. Following this presentation, the 
Institute accorded permission for the formation of a cell 
for the Application of Science and Technology to Rural 
Areas. This cell became known by its acronym ASTRA 
(which is the word for ‘weapon’ in Sanskrit) because it 
was meant to be a weapon against poverty in rural areas. 
Thus began a pioneering institutional experiment to evolv 
and apply S&T to rural areas. 
Model-based institutional experiment 
The ASTRA institutional experiment was based on a 
model of technology–rural society interactions. Models, 
it will be recalled, are a path to understanding in the face 
of a complex reality. They are simplified representations 
of reality serving to discover its essential features. Model 
building, however, has to be an iterative process. Starting 
with an initial model, its ability to reproduce the essential 
features of reality has to be tested empirically. Then, the
mis-match between model-based predictions and empiri-
cal results has to become the driving force for the improve-
ment of the initial model. 
The model underlying the formation and  
growth of ASTRA 
The following are the main features of the ASTRA model:  
· Technological development and societal demands are 
dialectically related, each transforming the other. 
 
Figure 1. Growth in total R&D expenditure. 
 
 
Figure 2. Growth in number of S&T agencies/organizations. 
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· Technological development is driven by societal demands 
(cf. technology–society interaction scheme, Figure 4). 
· Demands (backed by purchasing power) must be dis-
tinguished from wants (defined by human needs). 
· In a ‘dual society’ such as India, with a small affluent 
elite amidst a large economically deprived majority 
living primarily in rural areas, the technology–deve-
lopment system ignores (i.e. filters out) the wants of 
the rural masses because they are not backed by pur-
chasing power, and emphasizes the demands of those 
(elite) sections of society that have the purchasing power. 
· The first step in the development of technology for the 
underprivileged rural masses consists therefore of the 
identification of their felt needs. 
· This identification is best done, not from a remote/ lien 
environment, but through direct contact and ‘learning 
from the people’. 
· Hence, the importance of an ‘extension centre’ located 
in a rural setting. 
· The felt needs thus identified must then be translated 
into technical challenges. 
· These technical challenges must excite technical per-
sonnel and motivate them to come up with solutions 
that are appropriate to the rural context. 
· The technical challenges involve stringent constraints 
of low cost and ease of operation. Hence, the technical 
solutions that succeed are unlikely to be trivial or ‘low’ 
technology. They are also unlikely to be successfully 
tackled by technical personnel working casually in their 
spare time ‘after office-hours’. 
· Hence, the talent and expertise of advanced institu-
tions must be harnessed to address the ‘sophisticated’ 
technical challenges. 
· Whether the proposed solutions are appropriate or not 
can only be determined by going back ‘to the people’ 
and ‘test marketing’ the solutions. 
· Imperfect solutions have to be refined in an iterative 
process. 
· The identification of felt needs, the formulation of 
technical challenges, the provision of infrastructural 
support to those interested in tackling the technical 
challenges, the operation of an extension centre in a 
rural setting, etc. require a special organization/group 
with the mission of developing and disseminating tech-
nologies for rural felt needs. 
ASTRA 
The ASTRA experiment brought to bear on the chal-
lenges the prestige and competence of the Indian Institute 
of Science, which is one of the premier institutions of 
education, science and technology in the country. The 
Institute’s infrastructure for technology generation was 
combined in the ASTRA programme with a new rural 
d velopment and poverty-eradication perspective. Several 
key technology areas were identified such as energy (parti-
cularly biomass), low-cost housing, drinking water and 
agro-processing. The scientists and engineers involved 
quickly became pioneers in the field. There was a tre-
mendous feeling of excitement, as ASTRA became a hub 
of intellectual activity inspired by sensitivity to social 
oncerns and a moral fervour. There was support from a 
large number of faculty including several Fellows of the 
Academy of Sciences. Equally important was the top-
dow  upport from the institute (in particular, its Director, 
Satish Dhawan) and its council. 
 ASTRA as a programme of the Institute has survived 
for over 25 years. It has the infrastructure for technology 
generation and micro-diffusion. It has built an excellent 
reputation in Karnataka, India and abroad for past work. 
It i  sufficiently well funded. It has excellent linkage with 
tate-wide and countrywide technology dissemination agen-
cies (KSCST, CAPART, MNES, GEF, etc.). 
 Above all, the ASTRA programme of IISc served as a 
model for emulation and inspired a number of efforts in 
 
Figure 3. Growth in number of constituent S&T institutions. 
 
 
Figure 4. Technology–society interaction scheme. 
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other institutions such as the IITs. Perhaps even more 
important was ASTRA’s success in placing rural tech-
nology on the agenda of national institutio . Thus, towards 
the late 1970s and the 1980s rural technology started find-
ing a place in the Plan documents. 
What was right with the ASTRA model 
Several key features of the initial ASTRA model have 
been validated. First and foremost is the importance of 
identifying felt needs. Whereas in industrial R&D work, 
these needs are communicated through the market mecha-
nism, in the case of rural work, one is invariably dealing 
with sections of the population that do not have the pur-
chasing power to articulate their demands through the 
market. The rural studies of energy, buildings, water, etc. 
carried out by ASTRA proved a powerful platform for its 
work of technology development. 
 In this process, the extension centre proved crucial as 
an entry into rural life. Had the effort depended merely 
on hearsay or on ‘conventional wisdom’ regarding what 
was required or on foreign-consultant-type ‘hit and run’ 
visits, it would have been seriously handicapped. The 
ASTRA experiment also foresaw the interdisciplinary 
nature of the work, which it could address because it trans-
cended the discipline-constrained character of depart-
ments. Finally, the model rightly appreciated that success 
required first-rate S&T backed by the best scientists and 
engineers. However, subsequent experience has shown 
several inadequacies of the initial ASTRA model. 
What was inadequate in the ASTRA model 
When an organization is set up, its objectives are deve-
loped in interaction and by negotiation, with its environ-
ment. It has to earn active interst from the environment 
by sustaining the continued delivery of outputs of rele-
vance to the environment. R levance is therefore the first 
crucial requirement of a sustainable institution. Relevance 
is not measured merely by the quantity of outputs, but 
also by the quality of these outputs. Relevance is inevi-
tably, intimately and inextricably dependent upon excel-
lence of the organisation’s outputs. Excellence, therefore, 
is the second crucial characteristic of a sustainable insti-
tution. The achievement of excellence earns for the orga-
nization national and international recognition (that society 
tends to accept as an independent external assessment of 
the organization). Relevant excellence also ensures excel-
lent relevance. 
 Unfortunately, the initial model upon which ASTRA 
was based did not pay enough attention to establishing and 
ensuring mechanisms for peer review and quality control. 
Work that is relevant is not ips  facto excellent – just as 
there can be third-rate work on conventional technology, 
there can be third-rate work on rural technology. 
 The threat to excellence can come from a wide variety 
of devices used to circumvent and subvert the quality 
control system. Foremost among these devices are avoid-
ing publication in peer-reviewed journals and instead 
courting the local lay press and its non-specialist columns; 
steering clear of technical conferences; courting genera-
list bureaucrats instead of interacting with technical peers; 
publicizing funding as a proxy for technical achievement; 
presenting proposals as if they have been implemented, 
and plans and hopes as if they are actual accomplish-
ments; never making performance transparent with detai-
led reports. 
 Sufficient attention was also not devoted to the esta-
blishment of appropriate reward systems. There was far 
too much dependence on dedication and commitment be-
yond the call of duty. The situation was aggravated by 
the fact that most technologies required a seven-to-ten-
year gestation period to go from concept to penetration of 
society. This extent of commitment from the average sci-
entist/engineer was perhaps too much to expect without 
adequate rewards/recognition. 
 Above all, the ASTRA model paid inadequ te attention 
to the commercialization and dissemination of techno-
logies. Apart from the extreme cases where it was naively 
believed that R&D was enough, there was excessive reli-
ance on technology dissemination via government agen-
cies. The power of themarket and the potential role of 
entrepreneurs were inadequately appreciated. 
 It was also not initially appreciated that the quest for 
appropriate technologies often reveals three stages – first, 
the enthusiasm of amateurs, then the entry of competent 
technical expertise, and finally the enlightened and com-
petent management of the commercialization process. 
 Yet another major weakness of the initial ASTRA 
model was the absence of a gender emphasis in the dis-
semination of rural technologies even though many of 
these were of special relevance to women as beneficiaries 
as well as participants and actors. This was the case for 
instance with regard to the improved stove-dis emination 
programme. In fact, it was only when women were made 
the foc s of the programme did it start showing success. 
 Since the ASTRA experiment was initiated in 1974, 
th re has been a drastic change in the macroeconomic 
framework with the implementation of liberalization, pri-
vatization and globalization. Obviously, therefore the model 
must be updated in the light of these changes. 
Perspective of sustainable development 
The late 1980s and the early 1990s also saw the emphasis 
on so-called sustainable development – a  equitable, self-
reliant and environmentally sound development. 
 It is widely believed that the concept of sustainable 
development must be attributed to the Brundtland Com-
mission (World Commission on Environment and Deve-
lopment 1987) which defined it as ‘development that meets 
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the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet the future needs’3. Th re is 
no doubt whatsoever that without the emphasis and publi-
city given by the Brundtland Commission, the concept of 
sustainable development would never have attained the 
standing that it has. For the record, however, it should be 
mentioned that the Brundtland Commission had cited the 
energy work of Goldemberg et al. who authored the 
publication Energy for a Sustainable World published in 
a mimeographed form in 1985 and in a World Resources 
Institute booklet version4 in 1987 and in a book form5 in 
1988. Goldemberg et al. stressed that sustainable deve-
lopment should have the elements of ‘equity, economic 
efficiency, environmental soundness, long-term viability, 
self-reliance, and peace’. 
 With this perspective of sustainable development, 
ASTRA’s objectives have to reckon with the dimensions 
of economic efficiency, equity, environmental soundness, 
long-term viability and self-r liance. It is necessary there-
fore to set rural objectives in the broader framework of 
sustainable development. The emphasis has to be not merely 
on rural technologies but on sustainable t chnologies. 
An updated model 
An updated model must above all take into account the 
critical steps that determine the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the 
generation, commercialization and spread of rural tech-
nologies. In developing countries, the dissemination of 
rural technologies is basically a ‘push’ process in which 
the technology champions – the R&D scientists, the manu-
facturers, entrepreneurs and the State– act as technology-
transfer agents. Occasionally, however, the rural poor may 
provide a weak technology pull. 
 In a comprehensive framework, the underlying premise 
is that the commercialization sub-system (consisting of the 
manufacturer/user relationship interacting with the techno-
logy generator and the technology champion) is embedded 
in a larger system. This larger system consists of resource 
producers-cum-distributors and financial institutions, both 
of which have a strong influe ce on the commercialization 
process. Even this larger system is subject to the influence 
of its environment, which consists of the governmental deci-
sion-making process and the political systems, which trans-
mit their will supporting or impeding the process of com-
mercialization of improved technologies for rural areas. The 
comprehensive framework has to take into account the envi-
ronmental influences, the manufacturing strategy and the 
mode of commercialization. 
 The failures of commercialization of improved rural 
technologies are considered as occurring at two levels.
Failure at policy level 
If the government responsible for the national planning 
of resources does not emphasize the efficient use of those 
resources as the core of development strategy, the relevant 
technology faces potential failure in commercialization. 
Failure at supporting-i stitution level 
Failures of commercialization may also occur because (a) 
resource producers and distributors ignore the efficiency 
of resource use, restrict themselv s to increasing the sup-
plies of resources (and not improving the efficiency of 
their utilisation!) and monopolise the right to provide 
supplies, thereby precluding the possibility of alternative 
sources; and (b) financial institutions make investment 
decisions on the basis of an unfair comparison between 
centralized and decentralized technologies and have a bias 
towards the supply aspects of the resource rather than 
towards the efficiency of its use. 
 Hence, attention has to be turned to a more elaborate 
model that has been developed6 (Figures 5 and 6) to 
emphasize the special precautions that must be taken to 
avoid failures of technology generation, commerciali-
zation and dissemination. 
 Regarding technology generation, Figure 5 shows that 
there are two failure modes: (i) Failure to identify needs, 
F1 – A cognitive failure to understand and act on the basis 
of the true felt needs of technology users in rural society; 
and (ii) Failure of the R&D effort, F2 – A failure of the 
 
Figure 5. Failure modes in technology generation and commercia-
lization. 
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R&D process to develop a technology that satisfies the 
true felt needs of technology users in rural society. 
 
 Figure 5 also shows that there are four possible failure 
modes in technology commercialization: (i) Failure in the 
choice of commercialization process, F3 – A failure caused 
by an inappropriate manufacturing strategy and/or an in-
effective mode of distribution leading to inefficient demand 
signals; (ii) Failure to meet needs in order of priority, 
F4 – A failure to meet the neds of the villagers accord-
ing to their order of priority; (iii) Fa lure in operation, 
F5 – A failure to provide the inputs, to operate and main-
tain the technology, and to distribute or utilize the outputs, 
all under rural conditions; and (iv) Failure to modify beha-
viour, F6 – A failure of the change-a nts to modify the 
operational behaviour of the technology users to take advan-
tage of the technology, i.e. a failure to train the users. 
 The model shows that all the above six failure modes 
must be avoided if the commercialization of improved 
technologies in rural areas is to be successful. If the tech-
nology avoids the first five failure modes (i.e. the needs 
are identified, the R&D is successful, the correct com-
mercialization process is chosen, the needs ar  met in 
order of the users’ priorities and the technology can be 
operated successfully under rural conditions) but failure 
mode F6 occurs because no training is provided to help 
users to benefit from the technology, the whole under-
taking will inevitably fail. On the other hand, a good 
opportunity is lost if a successful technology avoids fai-
lure modes F1, F2, F3, F5 and F6 but encounters failure 
mode F4, i.e. the technology does not meet the priorities 
of the villagers. 
 Defects at the infrastructural and policy levels can cause 
the following two failures (Figure 6), which are as serious 
as the first six: (i) Failure in policy support, F7 – A failure 
of government to support the promotion of rural techno-
logies with a proper emphasis on the related issue of re-
source planning; (ii) Failure in infrastructural support, 
F8 – A failure of the methodology of comparing techno-
logies and of decision-making as to the choice of techno-
logies for investment. 
 
Though a correction of policy may eliminate failure mode 
F8 and create a proper environment for the choice of 
technologies, F7 may still occur because of disjointed deci-
sion-making. 
 Above all, the model implicitly emphasizes that itera-
tions of certain of its segments are essential for the suc-
cess of commercialization. It is here that the political, 
administrative and scientific will of the organizations invol-
ved becomes important. 
 The above description of failure modes does not refer 
explicitly to the question of which persons or organiza-
tions must determine the needs. It is obvious, however, 
from failure mode F4 that meeting the priority needs of 
the vil agers according to their order of priority is a result 
that is far more important than the process of who deter-
mines the needs and how the needs are identified. None-
theless, some processes of identifying needs – for instance, 
processes that avoid gender biases – are much more likely 
to lead to the desired result than others. 
 A related issue that is often raised is whether priority 
should first be assigned to income-generating techno-
logies and only then to technologies that as directed 
towards the satisfaction of basic needs, or whether basic-
needs satisfaction is addressed before income generation. 
Obviously, the answer depends upon the relative impor-
tance that the villagers, or rather their decision-makers, 
attach to basic-needs satisfaction and income generation. 
Barriers to commercialization7 
The commercialization of improved technologies in rural 
areas has been shown to involve a number of actors 
operating at various levels. In particular, the following 
are mentioned – technology users, technology manufactu-
rers and providers, technology generators, technology cham-
pions, financial institutions, and local, state and national 
governments and their decision-makers. Thus, action is 
required at the lowest level of the technology user (indi-
vidual, household or community) through the highest level 
of government. 
 Barriers to the commercialization process can arise at 
all these levels. An attempt will be made in this section to 
list the main barriers, to explore their origins and suggest 
ways of overcoming them. Once such a scheme is formu-
 
Figure 6. Failure modes in technology dissemination. 
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lated, it can be expanded and improved. In that sense, this 
section is intended to initiate a discussion of barriers to 
commercialization. 
Technology users 
The unaware: The commercialization of an improved 
technology in a rural area requires the concurrence of the 
ultimate user (individual, household or community) of 
the technology. In turn, this concurrence depends upon 
the potential user understanding the costs and benefits of
the various technological options, knowing about the 
improved technology and being aware of its relative 
advantages. A large number of technology users, however, 
are unaware of the advantages of the technology and of 
its cost-effectiveness. 
 The obvious way of overcoming this barrier is to pro-
vide information in various ways. Whereas door-to-do r 
canvassing, leaflets through the mail, newspapers and 
magazines are effective in urban areas with literate target 
audiences, in rural areas, demonstrations must play a key 
role in addition to radio and television. And, of course, 
the training of technology users is a powerful way of edu-
cating them with regard to the advantages of the techno-
logy. Thus, the supply of relevant information to, and the 
education of, the technology user is the means of over-
coming the barrier posed by the uninformed. 
 
The poor and/or first-cost sensitive: Even if a potential 
user is fully knowledgeable about the net benefits accru-
ing from the improved technology (designed as a replace-
ment for the conventional version), this user may not 
necessarily make the required investment on the associ-
ated device or equipment. Improved technologies may be 
more resource-efficient and therefore have lower operat-
ing costs, but they tend to have higher initial capital 
costs. This higher initial cost of the improved technology 
can become a serious barrier. 
 
The technology user naturally asks: do the benefits of the 
improved technology justify the increased investment? 
The answer to this question depends upon whether the 
technology user is prepared to invest capital resources 
now in order to reap the regular benefits in the future. In 
other words, is the technology user prepared to postpone 
current consumption for the sake of future benefits? 
 The index of this preparedness is the user discount rate 
(UDR). When empirically determined UDRs are compa-
red with the usual interest rates earned by money, it is 
found1,8 that the UDRs of individuals and households 
tend to be much higher than commercial discount rates of 
around 10 per cent. Obviously the UDR is a reflection of 
the availability of capital with the technology user – the more 
disposable cash the user has, the greater the preparedness 
to invest this cash now to earn benefits in the future.
 One would expect, therefore, that as the income of the 
technol gy user increases, the UDR used for investment 
decisions will decrease, and conversely, the poorer a user 
is, the less the likelihood of being prepared to sacrifice 
scarce capital on new devices and equipment, however great 
the advantages accruing from the improved technology. 
 If this first-cost sensitivity of the technology user is to 
b  overcome, the rate of return must be increased so that 
it exceeds the UDR The way to make rural technologies 
affordable even to the poor and/or to the first-cost sensi-
tive is to convert the initial down payment into a payments 
stream that coincides in time with the benefits stream. It 
is even better if the payments stream is financed out of 
the benefits stream. This situation can be achieved by a 
loan b ing advanced for the improved device or equip-
ment and the principal being recovered with interest. 
Alternatively, an agency can lease the improved device 
r equipment to the technology user, who then pays the 
regular leasing charges. Thus, innovative financing is  
the method of overcoming the barrier posed by the poor 
and/o  by first-cost sensitive. 
 
The h lpless: There is the class of technology users who 
are knowledgeable, can afford the improved technology 
and are motivated, but are nevertheless completely helpless 
in the face of all the problems that must be tackled in 
identifying, procuring, installing, operating and maintain-
ing the associated devices and equipment. 
 The origin of all these problems is that t is relatively 
easier for a technology user to purchase conventional 
equipment. Well-tested economic systems exist for making 
the associated transactions, and both producers and tech-
nology users understand the value of the devices invol-
ved. This is not always the case for investments in 
improvements. Compared with the mature industries asso-
ciated with the conventional equipment, the improved 
technology industry may be in the initial and infant stages 
of development and may quite often be limping along 
with government support, subsidies, etc. This invariably 
means that there is a great deal of paperwork to secure 
the requisite credit, negotiate with the suppliers/erectors 
of the improved devices or equipment, and get them 
installed. Unfortunately, it looks as if the technology user 
must have a great deal of know-how to identify, procure, 
install and maintain improved devices and equipment. 
Such a situation will prevail until the technology user can 
obtain total packages of hardware plus software (the lat-
ter being all the instructions and knowledge to run the 
hardware). In turn, this means that an efficiency-improve-
ment industry must be established and developed to pro-
vide these packages. 
 Thu , to overcome the barrier of the helpless techno-
logy user, it is necessary that an industry devoted to impro-
ved technology must be developed so that it can provide 
technology users with know-how in the form of t tal hard-
ware plus software packages. 
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Technology manufacturers 
The manufacturer with incompletely engineered technology: 
The innovation chain leading from a concept to a product/ 
process in the economy involves the crucial step of engi-
neering for manufacturing in which the working device 
or process produced by research, design and development 
has to be converted into a manufacturable product or pro-
cess. The step of engineering for manufacturing is essen-
tial because making 100, 1000 or 10,000 units (items or 
quantities) is a completely different matter from making 
one unit – the design, materials and manufacturing proce-
dure may have to be changed radically. Further, in many 
technologies, the design of the product/process may have 
to be modified to suit local conditions. The engineering 
for manufacturing involves a considerable product/process 
development effort. Further, t effort requires compe-
tent manpower, technical facilities and substantial funds. 
 The manpower, facilities and funds all present problems. 
R&D personnel tend to feel that their job is over with 
producing a working device, and they tend to be uninte-
rested in the product/process development because they 
consider it to be a trivial task. In fact, specialized person-
nel with competence in design, materials and manufactur-
ing procedure are required for the challenge. R&D insti-
tutions tend to be reluctant to llow their facilities to be 
used for product/process development. R&D funding agen-
cies dislike funding the engineering for manufacturing 
because it is not R&D, and financial institutions hesitate 
to fund the activity because the product/process is not yt 
proven – the activity cannot find funds easily because it 
‘falls between two stools’. 
 Thus, there are several barriers associated with engi-
neering for manufacturing – the barriers of non-available 
specialists, non-existent facilities and no funds for the 
crucial task of product/process development. The barrier 
of non-available specialists must be overcome with train-
ing programmes for engineering for manufacturing; the 
barrier of non-existent facilities with the establishment of 
special product/process d velopment centres; and the bar-
rier of no funds for the crucial task of product/process 
development, with the provision of venture capital from 
venture-capital institutions. 
 
The efficiency-blind: It is generally the case that the sales 
of devices and equipment are insensitive to the efficiency 
with which the equipment uses resources. In fact, these 
sales depend far more on the initial capital cost, because 
poor customers are sensitive to this cost; and since chea-
per equipment invariably means lower efficiency of 
resource use, the sales of improved technologies may 
actually be less than the sales of inefficient technologies. 
Such an environment encourages efficiency-blind manu-
facturers of end-use devices and equipment. Part of the 
problem is that the manufacturer and distributor of end-
use devices and equipment are not obliged either by mar-
ket pressure or by law to reveal the performance of the 
devices and equipment with regard to resource consump-
tion. For example, an Indian technology user cannot know 
which of a number of agricultural pumpsets has the lowest 
energy consumption. 
 The barrier to commercialization of improved techno-
logies arising from efficiency-blind manufacturers can be 
overcome by government intervention enforcing the labell-
ing of end-use devices and equipment, so that the pros-
p ctive buyer can take the resource consumption of the 
equipment into account even before purchasing it. The 
technology user will be further motivated to ascertain the 
performance of equipment if the financing of this equip-
ment (e.g. the interest rate) is tied to its performance. 
Resource producers and distributors 
The supply-obsessed: The producers and distributors of 
resources (water, electricity, petroleum products, etc.) are 
invariably so obsessed with the supply of their resources 
that they devote little attention to the utilization of these 
resources. In particular, they do not bother about the 
efficie cy with which their resources are being used. This 
s pply-obsession on the part of the producers and distri-
butors of resources has become a major barrier to the 
marketing of improved, resource-effici nt technologies. 
 The problem is aggravated by the fact that the market-
ing of improved technologies of resource-use is inhe-
r ntly more complicated than the marketing of resource 
supplies and conventional end-us  technologies. Attention 
must herefore be paid not just to the production of impr-
ved devices, but to the full spectrum of relatively novel 
marketing problems. To promote improved technologies 
effectively, efforts should address all these aspects of the 
marketing, i.e. the efforts should be concerned not just 
with the production f the hardware involved but with all 
the necessary supporting ‘software’ as well. 
 The producers and distributors of resources (irrigation 
departments, the electricity boards, oil companies and gas 
utilities) are good candidates for marketing the services 
required for such an effort. Accustomed to handling large 
quantities of capital, the producers and distributors of 
resources are well positioned to direct these resources to 
investments on improved technologies. Also, they have 
an administrative structue for channelling the capital to 
essentially all potential technology users (including house-
holds). Moreover, the billing systems of the suppliers of 
resourc s offer the opportunity for technology users to 
invest in improved devices with loans from the suppliers 
and t  pay back these loans through their resource bills. 
 If the charter of the producers and distributors of re-
s urc  is restricted to the supply of carriers, they cannot 
undertake the comprehensive marketing of improved tech-
nologies. What is required, therefore, is a conversion of 
resource-supply agencies into resource-se vice compa-
nies, that is, companies that market the services provided 
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by resources in much the same way they market resources 
today. Resource suppliers must diversify in this direction 
of resource services. Then, they would come to play a 
role similar to that originally envisaged for electricity 
companies by Thomas Edison when he invented the incan-
descent bulb – he proposed that utilities sell illumination, 
thereby giving them a financial interest to provide this 
illumination in the most cost-effective way. Similarly, if 
irrigation departments sell irrigation, rather than water, 
they would develop a vested interest in the efficiency with 
which water is used for irrigation. 
 Thus, the barrier of supply-obsessed producers of resour-
ces can be surmounted through a change in the charter of 
the producers from suppliers of resources to vendors of 
the services provided by resources, and/or a growth in 
independent resource-service companies. 
Financial institutions 
The supply-biased: Just as the producers and distributors 
of resources are obsessed with the supply aspect of the 
resource system, the financial institutions that provide the 
capital can also be supply-biased. 
 The origin of this barrier is the conventional approach 
to resources followed by financial institutions. According 
to this approach, the purpose of the resource system is  
to increase resource consumption, which means that the 
emphasis has to be on increasing the supply of resources. 
Improved technologies become a separate issue that is auto-
matically ignored because it does not lead to increases in 
supply and consumption. 
 This barrier has to be tackled firstly at the conceptual 
level, by propagating the paradigm that it is the level of 
resource services, rather than the magnitude of resource 
consumption, that is the true indicator of development. But 
a given resource servic  can be obtained either by increa-
sing the supply of the resource or by using more efficient 
devices – for example, better irrigation, i.e. uptake of water 
by crops can be achieved either by increasing the supply 
of water or by using more efficient irrigation pumpsets 
and/or reducing the losses in the water distribution chan-
nels. To know which is the best way of obtaining that 
service, the various options must be compared with each 
other. Hence, sound financial management requires that 
tenders must be called, not merely for augmenting supp-
lies, but for providing the resource services that are neces-
sary. In addition, improved technologies must be included 
in the least-cost planning process. 
 Thus, the best way of dismantling the barrier posed by 
the supply-biased is to shift the emphasis from resource 
consumption and supplies to the service provided by re-
sources, to include improved technologies in the list of 
options for providing services and to pursue the least-cost 
planning process. 
 
The unfair: If there is concern for least-cost resource plann-
ing, then it must be ensured that the comparison between 
supply increases (of centralized and decentralized sources) 
and conservation measures is fair. In the first place, 
resource savings should be treated symmetrically with 
resource production, because a unit of resource saved is 
equiv lent to a unit of resource generated. This might mean, 
for instance, that the expenses associated with resource 
efficiency are considered as the cost of service and used 
for a ‘cost plus’ method of charging customers, as in the 
case of supply technologies. Then all three contenders –
central sed sources, decentralised sources and conser-
vation measures – must be compared on the same terms 
of credit (including interest rates), benefits, i centives, 
subsidies, etc. 
 
 At present, the competition is certainly not fair. In parti-
cular, financial institutions tend to be unfair in their com-
parisons of supply increases and improved technologies –
the advantages are heavily weighted in favour of centra-
lized sources and against conservation measures, with 
decentralized sources in between. The origin of this unfair 
discrimination can be traced to the fact that the financial 
practices regarding resources have grown in association 
with the development of the centralized supplies, and over 
the course of time, a number of hidden subsidies and other 
supports for such supplies have evolved. 
 This barrier of the unfair financial institution must be 
overcome by an emphasis on fair competition through the 
limination of subsidies to resource supplies, correct pric-
ing, same terms of credits, benefits, incentives, etc. 
Government decision-makers 
The cost-blind price-fixer: Resource prices in developing 
countries are generally no reflection at all of the true (or 
real) costs to society of generating that resource – they 
include large elements of subsidy. In such situations, the 
frugal are not rewarded and the profligate are not puni-
shed. Technology users do not ‘feel the pinch’ of resource 
prices and do not receive the proper signals regarding the 
value of resources. Also, the resource consumption of these 
technology users tends to be largely unaffcted by small 
increases in the price of resources. Since resource prices in 
these countries are fixed by government decision-makers, 
the cost-blindness of these decision-makers has become a 
barrier to the commercialization of improved technologies. 
 Prices should be determined, however, not by the ave-
rage cost of cheap supplies established in the past, but by 
what it will cost to generate resources in the future. What 
matters is not the sunk cost of the previous unit of re-
source but how much it will cost to generate the next unit 
for the next technology user in the future. That is, prices 
should reflect the long-run cost of producing the next unit 
of resource in new generating stations – what the econo-
mists call long-run marginal-cost pricing – because that 
is what the resource companies will have to pay to set-up 
faciliti s to deliver this next unit. 
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 Attempts have to be made to move in the direction of 
long-run marginal-cost pricing, but the political barriers 
to increasing electricity prices must not be underestima-
ted. An important guideline in this context is that techno-
logy users are more concerned about their expenditures 
on resources than about resource prices. This means that 
technologies involving improvements in resource effici-
ency must be implemented simultaneously with price 
increases, so that the decrease in expenditure brought about 
by the efficiency improvement compensates (fully or par-
tially) for the increase in expenditure resulting from the 
price increase. 
 Thus, the barrier of the cost-blind price-fixing govern-
ment decision-maker can be surmounted by a move to-
wards long-run marginal cost pricing and by ensuring that 
price increases are implemented along with improved tech-
nologies. 
 There are two categoris of barrier to the effective com-
mercialization of rural technologies: (i) Endogenous barriers, 
which are internal to the process itself at the level of tech-
nology users and technology manufacturers; and (ii) exo-
genous barriers, which arise out of non-supportive (or 
even hostile) elements in the environment for the process 
of commercialization at the level of resource producers 
and distributors, financial institutions and government deci-
sion-makers. 
 The model that has been presented here involves both a 
systems approach and a hierarchical approach. The inter-
action between the environment of the rural technology 
and the commercialization process is explicitly considered 
in the model to achieve a total sys ems viewpoint. 
 The aim of the analysis is to achieve understanding, 
rather than evaluation, because the former is enlightening 
and encouraging, unlike the latter, which is threatening. 
The objective of the understanding is threefold: (i) design-
ing the commercialization of technology before a project 
is undertaken; (ii) improving the commercialization of 
technology ex post facto by analysing the degree of suc-
cess that has been achieved; and (iii) understanding the 
institutional, policy and other environmental constraints 
to technology design and commercialization and shaping 
governmental policies and institutional mandates and func-
tioning to promote the commercialization of improved 
technologies in rural areas. 
 The above analysis is helpful in developing a checklist 
that can be used when a new technology is under consi-
deration for commercialization. The checklist can serve 
as a tool for highlighting pitfalls of which the planner  
has to be wary. This will help in systematically increas-
ing the probability of success of the commercialization 
process. 
 The process of commercialization has been modelled 
in detail much in the same way as mechanical systems 
are depicted, mainly to highlight the failure modes of the 
system. Such modelling exercises are essential because 
they reveal many types of failure that cause concern to 
the R&D personnel involved in the generation of the rural 
technologies as well as to the decision-makers and policy-
makers attempting to provide the commercialization of 
improved technologies in rural areas. 
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